Measure of Damages--Aggravation of Previous Injury, Disease, Disability or Latent Weakness by Perlmutter, Helen & Kafka, Anne G.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 22 




Measure of Damages--Aggravation of Previous Injury, Disease, 
Disability or Latent Weakness 
Helen Perlmutter 
Anne G. Kafka 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Perlmutter, Helen and Kafka, Anne G. (1947) "Measure of Damages--Aggravation of Previous Injury, 
Disease, Disability or Latent Weakness," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 22 : No. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol22/iss1/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
free from contributory negligence, has been injured by an instrumen-
tality in the control of the defendant; it is to be applied when the
occurrence that causes the injury is unusual and unforeseen. When
these circumstances do not exist the rule does not apply. But when
they are present the rule of res ipsa loquitur is a rule to be applied
to enable the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case although he can-
not say wherein the defendant was negligent.30
WILLIAm A. CAHILL.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES-AGGRAVATION OF PREVIOUS INJURY,
DISEASE, DISABILITY OR LATENT WEAKNESS
1. Introduction
The law in some of its branches has been able to formulate
systems for measuring damages which operate in a more or less
mechanical manner. Such is the case, for example, in actions for
conversion, breach of contract, misrepresentation and trespass quare
clausum fregit. However, when the value of human life or its im-
pairment is involved, so many factors enter into the problem, that it
is quite impossible to develop any system which would be adaptable
to every case and treat each one justly. This is true especially of
certain tort actions, among them assault and battery, personal injuries
and death by wrongful act. In order to do justice in these cases
... such imponderable factors as degree of fault of defendant, fore-
seeability of results and proximity or remoteness existing between
defendant's act and the damages to plaintiff ... " must be consid-
ered, so that it is impossible that the law can work absolutely in this
field. Theoretically the measure of damages for personal injuries is
the money equivalent of the difference between the injured party's
physical condition before and after the injury. Practically, however,
many elements are involved. Plaintiff must be compensated, first,
for special expenses incurred, then for physical and mental suffering;
also for the value of time lost from work and for any lessening in
his future ability to work. Besides these factors, it is necessary to
30 Jesionowskd v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452, 91 L. ed. 355
(1947); Plumb v. Richmond Light & R. R., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504
(1922) ; San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 59 L. ed. 680 (1912).1 Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law of Damages hp Medico-Legal
Cases, 19 TEN's. L. REv. 255, 263 (1946).
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consider also the probable effect on the future health of the injured
party.2
Evaluation of special damages presents no particular problem,
for plaintiff must merely prove dollar for dollar actual expenses di-
rectly resulting from the injury. Pain and suffering, on the other
hand, are among the most difficult factors to measure. The value
of time already lost from work can be easily determined, but not so
with future inability, either total or partial. Medical science at most
can offer its opinion based on previous experience and knowledge
of the particular plaintiff's physical condition. But this can be un-
certain at its best. Even medical experts would find it impossible
to say that an injury will shorten the life span of an individual for,
let us say, five years, although they may be able to predict with rela-
tive certainty that the injury will be troublesome or handicap plaintiff
to a greater or lesser degree in the future.
Some or all of these problems may present themselves when the
injured party was in sound health at the time of the wrongful act.
The situation becomes even more complex, however, when the person
was already handicapped by illness, disease, disability or a latent
weakness at the time the injury occurred. The problem lies in the
difficulty of determining which conditions resulted directly from the
previous disease, disability or latent disease, and which conditions
have been caused solely by the wrongful act. In these cases it be-
comes important to distinguish between injuries resulting from the
accident, those resulting from aggravation of previous injuries or
diseases, and conditions which would have resulted in due course
regardless of the wrongful act.
II. Elements of Cause of Action
The rule is well settled in all jurisdictions that the same duty is
owed to the sick and infirm as to the healthy and strong." The lia-
bility of a wrongdoer is not predicated on the condition of a perfect
physical specimen only. One who wrongfully inflicts injury on an-
other is responsible for all the direct consequences of his act.4 This
is true even if the consequences are more disastrous as a result of a
previous condition than they would ordinarily have been.5 The mere
2 Id. at 255.
3 Florida Motor Lines Corporation v. Wood, 156 Fla. 838, 24 So. 2d 581
(1946); Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S. E. 2d 214 (1941); Simon
v. S. S. Kresge Co., 103 S. W. 2d 523 (1937); Webber v. Old Colony St.
Ry., 210 Mass. 432, 97 N. E. 74 (1912); Rawlings v. Clyde Plank &
Macadamized Road Co., 158 Mich. 143, 122 N . W. 504 (1909); Campbell v.
Los Angeles Traction Co., 137 Cal. 565, 70 Pac. 624 (1902).4 Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N. W. 403 (1891) ; Hanson v. Hall,
202 Minn. 381, 279 N. W. 227 (1938); Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82
N. H. 268, 133 Ati. 4 (1926).5 Beaumont Iron Works Co. v. Martin, 190 S. W. 2d 491 (1945) ; Matthews
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fact that the peculiar physical condition of the plaintiff caused en-
hancement of the injury or the fact that an injury might not have re-
sulted at all in a healthy person will not relieve a defendant from
liability for a breach of duty to the plaintiff, but may only act in
mitigation of damages.6
Proximate cause is another important element to be considered,
since there exist special ramifications in connection with cases of this
nature. The case of Vosburg v. Putney7 is still the leading case in
most jurisdictions. There one school boy kicked another who was
at that time suffering from a minor knee injury. After the battery
the injury developed into a serious bone infection, resulting in per-
manent disability. The defendant argued that the previous injury
was the proximate cause of disability. However, the court held the
wrongdoer liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful
act, whether or not they could have been foreseen. Testimony estab-
lished that the kick was the exciting cause.
Furthermore, lack of knowledge of plaintiff's sensitivity would
not decrease the obligation, for the defendant is liable for all actual
consequences.8 Therefore, actual foreseeability of consequences or
knowledge of the peculiar condition of the plaintiff are not factors
to be considered in determining the liability of the defendant or the
measure of damages.
III. Measure of Damages
The measure of damages, as determined by a jury under a proper
charge, consists of subtracting the condition which would have re-
sulted in any event because of the weakened condition of the plaintiff
from the condition which exists after the accident. 9 It is not neces-
sary to have new and independent injuries in order for a good cause
of action to exist, for the aggravation of an old injury or disease, or
the activation of a latent disease is sufficient.10 A case illustrating
this proposition is Schide v. Gottschick," in which the plaintiff was
injured in an elevator accident, and the defendant claimed her present
disability was due to previous injuries suffered in an auto accident.
The instructions of the lower court were confusingly worded so as to
indicate to the jury that they need not consider any aggravation of
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 54 Cal. App. 2d 549, 129 P. 2d 435 (1942); Flood
v. Smith, 126 Conn. 644, 13 A. 2d 677 (1940).
6 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 152 F. 2d 46
(C. C. A. 2d 1945).
7 80 Wis. 523, 50' N. W. 403 (1891).8 Cf. Spade v. Lynn & B. R. R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N. E. 747 (1899).
9 Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law of Damages in Medico-Legal
Cases, 19 TENN. L. Rv. 255, 261 (1946).
20 Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Hill 304 Ky. 565, 201 S. W. 2d
731 (1947); Owen v. Dix, - Ark. -, 196 S. W. 2d 913 (1946).12 329 Mo. 64, 43 S. W. 2d 777 (1931).
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previous injuries in assessing damages. The higher court pointed out
that while plaintiff was not entitled to recover for conditions due en-
tirely to previous injuries and diseases, the rule is that plaintiff may
recover for the aggravation of existing ailments caused by negligent
acts of the defendant, even if no new injuries result.
Concerning previous injuries and existing diseases, the jury must
determine from all the evidence what portion of the plaintiff's pain
and suffering is due to the injury in question and what portion is
due to the previous injury or disease.12 In Arkansas-Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Campbell 1 3 it was said, "Even if the evidence showed that
appellee had been injured by the Standard Oil Company and was
still suffering of that injury [at the time of the second injury], yet
if the appellant negligently injured her, she would be entitled to re-
cover from it compensation for such injury." But, if the previous
injury has entirely healed, or plaintiff has completely recovered from
the disease, it is error to introduce evidence concerning it,14 as was
indicated in a Florida case, Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Batchis.15
Here plaintiff was injured while she was a passenger in a street car,
which stopped suddenly, causing her to be thrown violently against
a seat. Plaintiff was in normal health on the day of the injury and
the jury was properly instructed not to consider any previous illness
or disease under which she may have labored in the past, and from
which she had recovered at the time of the accident, in determining
the compensation to which she was entitled.
There is a group of cases also where the injury was more serious
because of plaintiff's abnormal physical condition before the accident.
In Beaumont Iron Works Co. v. Martin,16 for example, plaintiff suf-
fered head injuries when a window pane fell to the sidewalk from
defendant's building due to defendant's negligence. These injuries
were more severe than would normally have followed from such a
blow, sirice medical testimony established certain abnormal charac-
teristics of plaintiff's pituitary gland. In Matthews v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry.,17 a railroad switchman received disabling injuries to
the left arm as a result of an engine foreman's negligence. The evi-
dence established that previous to the accident plaintiff had an ab-
normal condition of the left elbow in that there was a limited range of
motion and the elbow was not of normal shape, and that it was quite
possible that no disability would have resulted had the arm been nor-
mal. Similarly, in Flood v. Smith, 8 a gardener received a shoulder
blade fracture which aggravated a pre-existing thyroid condition. In
22 Schwingschlegl v. City of Monroe, 113 Mich. 683, 72 N. W. 7 (1897);
Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y. 621 (1883).
23203 Ark. 307, 156 S. W. 2d 255, 258 (1931).14 Glasgow v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 191 Mo. 347, 89 S. W. 915 (1905).
15 54 Fla. 192, 44 So. 933 (1907).
16 190 S. W. 2d 491 (1945).
17 54 Cal. App. 549, 129 P. 2d 435 (1942).
18 126 Conn. 644, 13 A. 2d 677 (1940).
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all these cases the court held, according to the general rule, that plain-
tiffs can recover full compensation for all damage proximately re-
sulting from defendant's negligence, even though plaintiffs' injuries
were more serious than they would otherwise have been because of
the pre-existing physical conditions.
A wrongdoer is liable for all the consequences of a dormant
disease brought into activity.19 In a particular case, Larson v. Boston
Elevated Ry.,20 where latent tuberculosis germs were present and
solely by reason of the lowered resistance caused by the accident
tuberculosis developed, the jury correctly found that tuberculosis was
the direct result of the injury and assessed damages therefor. It has
been said that, ". . . the established rule is that where the result of
an accident is to bring into activity a dormant or incipient disease,
or one to which the injured person is predisposed, the negligence
which caused the accident is the proximate cause of the disability and
the person responsible for negligence is liable for the entire damages
which ensue." 21 However, latent ailments aggravated are compen-
sable only where the connection between the injury and the subse-
quent disease is direct and immediate. It was held in a recent Ken-
tucky case 22 that the evidence did not sufficiently establish that
plaintiff's failing vision was due solely to the accident, but that it
may just as well have resulted solely from a latent condition or from
a nervous disorder from which he was known to be suffering and
for which reason he had received a medical discharge from the United
States Navy. The rule was stated in a New York case, Searles v.
Manhattan Ry.,23 as follows: "When the fact is that the damages
claimed in an action were occasioned by one of two causes, for
one of which the defendant is responsible and for the other of
which it is not responsible, plaintiff must fail if his evidence does
not show that the damage was produced by the former cause."
It would follow from this that if a disease was completely latent prior
to the wrongdoing which activated it, that the defendant is respon-
sible for damages for all the pain, suffering and disability which ensue,
as opposed to his liability in the case of a disease or injury which was
already active in which latter case there would be a certain mitigation
of damages. In one case, City of Rock Island v. Starkey,24 plaintiff,
who was an hysterical subject and had had nervous diseases before
the accident, received injuries in a fall on a defective sidewalk. The
39 Owen v. Dix, - Ark. -, 196 S. W. 2d 913 (1946) ; Levy v. Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North America 8 So. 2d 774 (1942); Piper v. Spiro, 188 So. 665(1939) ; Atlantic & B. R. do. v. Douglas, 119 Ga. 658, 46 S. E. 867 (1904).
20212 Mass. 262, 98 N. E. 1048 (1912).
2138 AM. Jum, NFuGMCE-§ 82; Owen v. Dix, - Ark -, 196 S. W. 2d
913 (1946); Levy v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 8 So. 2d 774
(1942); St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Lewis, 91 Ark. 343, 121 S. W. 268 (1909).2 2 Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Hill, 304 Ky. 565, 201 S. W. 2d
731 (1947).23 101 N. Y. 661, 5 N. E. 66 (1886).
24 189 Ill. 515, 59 N. E. 971 (1901).
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evidence tended to show something more than a mere latent tendency
to a particular disease. The court held that if, prior to the injury,
plaintiff had diseases which were aggravated by the fall, she might
recover from the defendant, but its liability would be measured only
by the damages which were the natural and proximate results of its
negligence, or in other words, that defendant may show in mitigation
of damages that part of plaintiff's suffering resulted solely from her
previous condition.
The measure of damages where the aggravated disease developed
from a discreditable condition due to improper habits' of the plaintiff,
such as alcoholism, is no different from the damages computed in
cases involving existing disease or previous injury. In a leading New
York case, McCahill v. N. Y. Transportation Co.,2 5 in which delirium
tremens was precipitated by an accident, the court held that the neg-
ligent act directly set in motion the sequence of events, which caused
the death at the time it occurred, regardless of the fact that the de-
cedent may have died of delirium tremens in the ordinary course o'
events. The question which arises in cases of this nature is whether
the court should concern itself with the distinction between ordinary
pre-existing unhealthy conditions and pre-existing conditions due to
the improper habits of plaintiff's decedent. In a case in another jur-
isdiction, Dickson v. Hollister,2 6 the court suggested by way of obiter
dictum that such distinction might properly be made. This proposi-
tion was specifically repudiated by a later New York case, Turner
v. Nassau Electric R. R. Co., 27 which case set the precedent for sub-
sequent cases, including the McCahill case aforementioned. The
court therein said, ". . . it requires altogether too great a stretch of
moral responsibility and necessitates the investigation of cause and
effect, and would carry us into metaphysical and psychological specu-
lation, to an extent outside the possibility of judicial inquiry ...
When disease has supervened from any cause, any aggravation of that
condition by the negligence of another is a cause of action for dam-
ages, provided such damages are solely set in motion and caused by
the injury" (italics ours). The New York rule appears to be the
prevailing rule throughout most jurisdictions. For example, in one
case, Jacque v. Locke Insulator Corp.,28 plaintiff's decedent had been
a Workman who had suffered from silicosis caused by inhaling poison-
pus elements. The higher court found that it was not reasonable to
hold as a matter of law that a jury could not find that silicosis was
a. factor contributing to fatality, when it appeared that death was ac-
celerated by this silicosis, even though a major contributing -factor
was a pre-existing aneurysm, the origin of which was syphillitic. An
Alabama case, St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Savage,29 held that
25 210 N Y. 221 94 N E. 616 (1911).
26 123 Pa. 421, 16 At. 484 (1889).
27 41 App. Div. 213, 58 N. Y. Supp. 490 (2d Dep't 1899).
2870 F. Zd 680 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
29 163 Ala. 55, 50 So. 113 (1909).
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evidence that plaintiff, who was injured in a train wreck, was an im-
moderate drinker, was properly considered inadmissible, since there
was no evidence that the injuries might have resulted from excessive
drinking. A third case, Ramlow v. Moon Lake Ice Co.,30 involved
an employee who sustained a fracture of the right leg and suffered
an attack of delirium tremens two days later, which subsequently
caused death. The fact that his system had been so weakened by his
intemperate habits in the use of liquor that he was unable to with-
stand the effects of the injury did not shift the proximate cause of
death from his injuries to his intemperate habits. Where a mere
bruise, which would not have resulted in prolonged disability but for
latent gonorrhea, activated the latent disease and resulted in dis-
ability, the claimant in Hanson v. Dickinson 31 was entitled to com-
pensation. In all of these cases the courts found it unnecessary to
consider whether the unhealthy conditions of the plaintiffs resulted
from improper personal habits, intemperateness, or repugnant social
diseases, but applied the samine legal principles as in any ordinary case
of previous ill health or physical weakness.
In both civil and criminal law, one who inflicts injury upon an-
other already ill or dying is nevertheless responsible for the death,
provided, of course, the death is directly related to the injury.3 2 In
Mussuzn v. Steele,33 where a septicemia victim, on route to a hos-
pital, was involved in an accident when the ambulance overturned
due to the driver's negligence, the court held it a question of fact for
the jury whether the negligence caused or hastened death by pneu-
monia. The charge pointed out that even if plaintiff would have died
anyway, defendant would still be responsible for the death when it
actually occurred. The measure of damages in these cases where
death ensues is the same as in the ordinary wrongful death action,
namely, pecuniary loss to the next of kin,3 4 with the exception, how-
ever, that here the defendant is permitted to show in mitigation of
damages that plaintiff's decedent's life would have been materially
shortened by his pre-existing unhealthy condition.3 5 This point was
brought out in Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 3 in which case a
master left his ill servant seven hundred feet from his home because
of water on the road. Medical testimony established that death was
30 192 Mich. 505, 158 N. W. 1027 (1916).
32 188 Iowa 728, 176 N. W. 823 (1920).
32 PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 (1941) ; Baker v. State
Industrial Accident Commission, 128 Ore. 369, 274 Pac. 905 (1929); Foley v.
Pioneer Min. & Mfg. Co., 44 Ala. 178, 40 So. 273 (1906) ; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Jones, 83 Ala. 376, 3 So. 902 (1888); State v. Smith, 73 Iowa 32,
34 N. W. 597 (1887); 1 HAIE, HisToRY OF THE PiEAs OF THE CRowx 428
(new ed. 1800).
33 126 Neb. 353, 253 N. W. 347 (1934).3 4 PRoss , HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 (1941).
35 McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 AtI. 810 (1926) ; Chicago, R. I.
& G. Ry. v. Groner, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 65, 111 S. W. 667 (1908).36 82 N. H. 268, 133 AUt. 4 (1926).
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possibly due to heart failure from over-exertion. The jury was in-
structed that it may consider the fact that the original illness was
fatal in mitigation of damages, but that did not bar recovery. It has
been held that mortality tables may be excluded in a case where the
evidence is already sufficient to determine the probable duration of
life.3 7 However, if the jury is permitted to consider life tables in
such a case, it must be under a charge making it clear to the jury
that these tables are to be given weight only as one factor in relation
to all the evidence.8s
IV. Burden of Proof and Charge
The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence that
the existing pain, suffering and disability are due to defendant's neg-
ligence or wrongful act.3 9 It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove
just how much he would have suffered from his unfit state of health
if the injury had not been received by him.40  That is for the defen-
dant to prove. The defendant must show that a certain specified
portion of the pain, suffering and disability is due to an unhealthy
condition of the plaintiff unconnected with his negligence. The de-
fendant may prove this in mitigation of damages, but it is not a de-
fense to him.41
It is a question of fact for the jury to determine what portion
of damages is due to defendant's wrongful act and what portion is
totally unrelated. It is proper for the court to instruct the jury that
the defendant is responsible for all the ill effects which naturally and
necessarily follow the injury with reference to the condition of health
in which the plaintiff was at the time of the occurrence which is the
basis of the law suit.42  It is incorrect for the court to instruct the
jury to find for the defendant if the jury is unable to separate dam-
ages and pain caused by the existing disease or injury from damages
caused by the injury inflicted by the defendant. 43  The jury must
apportion such damages in accordance with all the evidence and ex-
pert medical testimony presented at the time of trial. It was held
error, in Saunders v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,44 to permit the
court to instruct the jury to find that the proximate cause of death
3 McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 At]. 810 (1926).
38 Ibid.
39 Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Campbell, 203 Ark. 307, 156 S. W. 2d
255 (1941); Cull v. Union Ry., 192 App. Div. 649, 183 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1st
Dep't 1920).40 Hahn v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R, 92 N. J. L. 277, 105 Atl. 459 C1918);
Sherman v. Indianapolis Traction Co., 58 Ind. 623, 96 N. E. 473 (1911).
41 Simon v. S. S. Kresge Co., 103 S. W. 2d 523 (1937); Hahn v. Delaware,
L. & W. R R, 92 N. J. L. 277, 105 Atl. 459 (1918).4 2 Jones v. City of Caldwell, 20 Idaho 5, 116 Pac. 110 (1911).
43 Sherman v. Indianapolis Traction & Terminal Co., 48 Ind. 623, 96 N. E.
473 (1911).
44240 Pa. 66, 87 Atl. 420 (1913).
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was the aggravation of a pre-existing kidney condition resulting from
an accident, where such theory of the case was not presented by the
pleadings or evidence.
Because there are so many imponderable factors, courts hesitate
to set aside a jury's appraisal of the damages, where there has been
reasonable certainty of proof as to those damages. However, the
court will, on appeal, set aside a verdict when it feels that proof of
such damages has not been established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
V. Conclusion
The law in this field has remained relatively constant and uni-
form throughout most jurisdictions. Variation in outcome of these
cases has resulted from changes and progress in the science of mnedi-
cine rather than from changes in law. Since expert medical testi-
mony is one of the most important factors here, damages may be more
exactly measured as the study of medicine advances. For example,
in 1888, in Trapnell v. City of Red Oak Junction,40 where plaintiff
fell on defendant's defective sidewalk and developed pains the next
day, the pains ultimately developing into cancer, it was held as a
matter of law that incipient cancer must have been present before
the accident, on the theory that it was unlikely that such a blow would
cause cancer. But in 1931, in Sussman v. Sussnzan,47 where plain-
tiff developed cancer of the stomach some time after receiving stom-
ach injuries, it was held a question of fact for the jury whether the
injury was the proximate cause. It is quite possible that medical
research in the field of cancer having made more accurate medical
testimony possible, the results in these two cases, similar in their
facts, were therefore exactly opposite.
Further variation of pecuniary estimates of damages result from
the individual skill of attorneys in presenting the facts to the jury,
as well as the peculiar makeup of each jury. It is for these further
reasons that twelve reasonable men with almost identical facts come
forth with strongly divergent verdicts. The most the court can do
to arrange for stability is to give proper instructions and set aside
verdicts which are obviously unjust, but the actual amounts of money
awards will remain uncertain and unrelated to fixed standards. The
economic standards of the time and community, including the then
4 5 Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law of Damages i Medico-Legal
Cases, 19 TENN. L. REv. 255, 265 (1941), wherein is stated, "Evaluation of
proper monetary compensation in respect to parts of the human body damaged
or destroyed cannot be accomplished with... precise accuracy, and courts are
therefore timid about holding the jury verdict to be excessive except in the
clearest ... cases."
46 76 Iowa 744, 39 N. W. 884 (1888).
47 108 N. J. L. 384, 156 AP. 496 (1931).
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current value of the dollar, also play an important part in the de-
termination of the verdict.
It can readily be seen from the above statements that although
there has been relatively little change in the .measure of damages as
set down by the law in cases of aggravation of previous injury, dis-
ease, disability or latent weakness, a wide variation among actual
verdicts must result.
HELEN PERLMUTTER,
ANNE G. KAIFKA.
